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Abstract
In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and ﬁrms enter into
dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal
terminations. Upon termination, the ﬁrm hires a new worker, and the worker
who is terminated receives a termination contract from the ﬁrm and is then free
to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter
into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium
terminations that resemble, respectively, the two kinds of labor market separa-
tions that are typically observed in practice: involuntary layoﬀs and voluntary
retirements. The model allows for the simultaneous determination of a large
set of important labor market variables including equilibrium unemployment
and labor force participation. An algorithm is formulated for computing the
model’s equilibria. I then simulate the model to show quantitatively that the
model is consistent with a set of important stylized facts of the labor market.
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In an equilibrium model of the labor market, jobs are dynamic contracts, job sep-
arations are terminations of dynamic contracts. Matched workers and ﬁrms enter
into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal
terminations. Moral hazard is the information friction, that contracts are dynamic
and terminations are part of the optimal contract are both motivated by incentive
considerations. Upon termination, the ﬁrm hires a new worker, the terminated worker
receives a termination compensation contract from the ﬁrm, and is then free to go
back to the labor market to seek new matches and enter into a new contract, or to
stay temporarily or permanently out of the labor market.
The model thus allows for the simultaneous determination of the size and com-
position of the economy’s equilibrium employment, unemployment, and retirement.
Most existing equilibrium models of the labor market focus on the interaction between
employment and unemployment, without modelling explicitly the state of not-in-the-
labor-force and hence the size of the labor market. 1 Also endogenously determined
in the model is the economy’s equilibrium labor turnover (ﬂows between employment
and unemployment, and the ﬂow into retirement), as well as a set of other impor-
tant labor market variables, including the dynamics and distribution of wages and
expected utilities of employed workers, the distribution retired workers, the starting
expected utility of newly hired workers, and the equilibrium expected utility of the
new labor market entrants.
Despite potentially complicated dynamics that may arise in the model environ-
ment, the equilibrium of the economy has a simple structure regarding termination.
Speciﬁcally, the model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that re-
semble, respectively, the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically
observed in practice: involuntary layoﬀs and voluntary retirements. When an invol-
untary layoﬀ occurs, the ﬁrm promises no future payments to the worker, and the
expected utility of the worker is strictly lower than that of the new worker the ﬁrm
hires to replace him. When a voluntary retirement occurs, the worker leaves the ﬁrm
with a termination compensation that is equal to a sequence of constant payments,
and he never goes back to the labor market to seek new employment again.
Unemployment is involuntary in my model, as in the models of eﬃciency wages (
e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989). Compared to the
1For example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1997), Shimer (2005), Moscarini (2005), Nagypal (2005).
Sun-Bin Kim (2001) and Moscarini (2003) are exceptions. In both papers though, an additional
source of worker heterogeneity is introduced into the Mortensen-Pissarises framework in order to
generate ﬂows into retirement. In Moscarini (2003) for example, the productivity of a match depends
on a match speciﬁc variable, as well as a non-match-speciﬁc variable that captures the ability of the
worker. The values of both variables are learned during a match, workers whose non-match-speciﬁc
variable are learned to be suﬃciently low choose to withdraw from the labor market. In my model,
the simultaneous modelling of the three states of the labor market is based on a single information
friction.
1eﬃciency wage models, my model oﬀers at least three advantages. First, eﬃciency
wage models are often criticized because the employment contracts in these models are
not fully optimal (Carmichael, 1985). In Shapiro and Stiglitz, for example, because
wages are constant, termination (lay-oﬀ) is the only incentive device that ﬁrms have
available to prevent workers from shirking. 2 In my model, workers and ﬁrms enter
into explicit and fully optimal dynamic contracts where wages vary optimally with
the worker’s performance history. Second, in the existing models of eﬃciency wages,
in equilibrium no workers are actually ﬁred. The contract makes eﬀort-making incen-
tive compatible so no one shirks, and the unemployed are a rotating pool of workers
who quit for reasons that are exogenous to the model. In the model here, workers
are actually ﬁred involuntarily from their jobs: ﬁring is part of the model’s equilib-
rium path. Third, my model permits simultaneously involuntary unemployment and
voluntary retirement as its equilibrium outcome.
The economic logic for the equilibrium voluntary retirement in my model is in-
tuitive. Because of the worker’s decreasing marginal utility of consumption, the cost
of compensating the worker for a given amount of eﬀort is higher as the worker’s
expected utility increases. On the other hand, the way that incentives are provided
optimally in this environment requires that each time the worker produces a high out-
put, he is rewarded with a higher expected utility. Imagine now the worker produces
a sequence of high outputs to make his expected utility suﬃciently high. Then it will
become too expensive for the ﬁrm to compensate for the worker’s eﬀorts, and the
ﬁrm will then ﬁnd it eﬃcient to replace the worker with an unemployed worker whose
eﬀorts are less expensive. The worker leaves the ﬁrm voluntarily, for his expected
utility is not reduced upon termination. The worker will not go back to the labor
market after termination, because other ﬁrms also would ﬁnd him too expensive to
employ.
In the model, retirement is optimal and determined by the worker’s history of
performance and the cost of the new worker that the ﬁrm could hire to replace him.
Retirement is an incentive and compensation consideration. It occurs as a conse-
quence of ﬁrms eﬃciently motivating and compensating their workers. Retirement is
not a life-cycle consideration, as the workers are “perpetually” young (they die with
a constant probability) in my model. Retirement does not depend on the worker’s
tenure per se, although it does depend indirectly on the worker’s tenure because it
takes time before the worker’s expected utility becomes suﬃciently high to justify
retirement. There is not a unique retirement date in my model. There is a set of
performance histories that can all lead to voluntary retirement. This property of my
model diﬀerentiates it from Lazear’s (1979) theory of mandatory retirement, which is
based mainly on job tenure. In Lazear, it is imposed that there is a deterministic date
T after which the worker’s reservation wage exceeds his value of marginal product,
2MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) avoids this critique by modelling employment as a repeated
game whose equilibrium path is then viewed as a self-enforcing implicit contract.
2and T is the retirement date. 3
This paper oﬀers an alternative to the existing theories of equilibrium worker
turnover (job separation). Existing models of equilibrium turnover are built around a
key variable: the productivity or quality of the job match. In the existing models, it is
the evolution of the true or perceived quality of the current job match that provides an
engine for job separation. In Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini (2005), turnover occurs
after the ﬁrm and the worker have learned enough about the true quality of the current
job match. In Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
separation occurs after a stochastic but exogenous process takes the productivity of
the current match to a suﬃciently low level. In the models of on-the-job-search,
matches dissolve after the arrival of new matches with a higher level of productivity.4
I take a dynamic contract point of view to modelling equilibrium worker turnover
in this paper. Worker turnover is motivated by the provision of dynamic incentives
and risk sharing. Workers and ﬁrms are homogeneous in my model, and all matches
are identical: they operate the same production function in all periods. Termination
occurs not because the technology of the current match has evolved to be suﬃciently
poor as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), or it is found out to be suﬃciently bad
as in Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini (2005), or the arrival of a new match that is
more productive. Termination occurs because the economic relationship that evolved
endogenously around the ﬁxed match technology has become too costly for the parties
to maintain.
Existing theories of equilibrium turnover typically generate only ﬂows into un-
employment. In my model, the same information friction that motivates separations
that generate ﬂows from employment to unemployment also generates ﬂows from
employment to retirement. On at least one dimension then, my approach to equilib-
rium turnover is more powerful in accounting for labor market activity than existing
models.
This paper also extends the existing theories of dynamic contract that follow Green
(1987) and Spear and Srivastava (1987). What I do in this paper is to put fully dy-
namic contracts with endogenous termination into an equilibrium framework to allow
agents to enter and exit contracting relationships multiple times. Equilibrium tran-
sitions between dynamic contracts have not been modelled in the existing literature.
3Lazear (1979) illustrates an environment where there is a ﬁxed date T of separation which is
independent of the labor contract. In order to prevent both the worker and the ﬁrm from cheating,
especially unilateral termination before T arrives, it is optimal to make the wage scheme back-loaded.
The ﬁrm then ﬁres the worker after some exogenously given date T which corresponds to the eﬃcient
separation. The logic of my story is quite diﬀerent. In my model, the expected utility of the worker
moves up and down to provide incentives for eﬀorts, but if it goes to high, then the worker should
be terminated. The optimal date of termination and the optimal compensation contract are solved
jointly.
4See Burdett (1978), Pissarides (1994), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Shimer (2006). Nagypal
(2004) combines the mechanism in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and that in the search models
of job turnover.
3Models of dynamic contracts with limited commitment5 model opportunities that
are oﬀered outside the dynamic contract, but the modelling strategy that has been
taken in that literature is to include a self-enforcing condition in the constraint set
for the optimal contract. This self-enforcing condition ensures that the agent never
has incentives to leave the existing contract, and hence the contractual relationship
never comes to an end. I take a very diﬀerent modelling approach. I explicitly model
termination as part of the optimal contract, and allow agents to transition from one
dynamic contract to another, or to stay out of any contracts. Thus a dynamic con-
tract in my paper is an open rather than closed process that makes optimal use of
available outside opportunities, instead of building a defence against them.
At the heart of my analysis is a termination mechanism that is built on Spear and
Wang (2005), otherwise standard model of repeated moral hazard. This external
labor market allows the ﬁrm to terminate the existing worker and replace him with
a new worker. Spear and Wang then show that optimal termination occurs when the
worker is either too poor or too rich to motivate. 6 Spear and Wang is a partial
model where terminated workers are never employed again, and the workers’ reserva-
tion utility must then be exogenously ﬁxed. That framework is not suitable for the
discussion of the distinction between involuntary layoﬀs and voluntary retirements.
Since retirement is a decision to quit the labor market, in order to model it explicitly,
the agent must be given the choice between staying in or leaving the labor market.
In the current paper, workers who are terminated are allowed to go back to the labor
market to seek new employment opportunities, and the model makes clear predictions
about who actually choose to go back to the labor market and who choose to stay
out of the labor market.
An important feature of the dynamic contracts in this paper is that they are
required to be renegotiation proof. This not only makes economic sense, but also helps
to simplify the model’s equilibrium structure. Speciﬁcally, that the contracts must be
renegotiation proof implies that, in a forward looking sense, all unemployed workers
are identical. This helps me to avoid dealing with a non-degenerate distribution of
unemployed workers, oﬀering analytical tractability for the characterization of the
model’s equilibria. Since workers are homogeneous in ability, that contracts must
be renegotiation proof implies that the termination compensation of an involuntarily
5For example, Thomas and Worrall (1990), Kocherlatota (1996), Phelan (1995), Krueger and
Uhlig (2006).
6Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) was the ﬁrst to model termination as an incentive device in a repeated
labor market environment where there is a single worker and one ﬁrm, and the terminated worker
is not replaced. Termination of dynamic contract as an incentive device is also studied by DeMarzo
and Fishman (2003) in a partial equilibrium model of ﬁnancial lending with privately observed
cash ﬂows. In a continuous-time model of dynamic moral hazard, Sannikov (2007) also obtains the
result that optimal replacement occurs when the agent’s continuation value is either too low or too
high. He also shows that termination depends on other parameters of the contracting environment,
including the relative time preferences of the principal and the agent. Like other models in the
related literature, Sannikov (2007) also studies a partial equilibrium environment.
4terminated worker (who after termination goes back to the labor market to seek new
employment) must be zero. Otherwise, the ﬁrm and the worker can always renegotiate
to make both parties strictly better oﬀ. The renegotiation simply requires that the
worker gives back the termination compensation and the ﬁrm hires back the worker.
Long-run consumption and utility distributions have been a major focus of in-
terest in the dynamic contracting literature. Green(1987) and Atkeson and Lucas
(1992,1995) show that optimal dynamic incentives could induce degenerate consump-
tion and wealth distributions with consumption and wealth inequality growing with-
out limit among ex ante identical agents. Termination is not necessary for obtaining a
non-degenerate long-run distribution in models of dynamic private information with
many agents, as the literature has shown. 7 But, as this paper shows, termination
does aﬀect distribution. Termination limits the scope of incentive-induced inequality
by putting an upper bound on the set of equilibrium utilities of the workers, employed
and non-employed. This upper bound is endogenous to the model, and depends on
the curvature of the worker’s utility function, or how fast the worker’s marginal utility
decreases with consumption. The faster marginal utility decreases with consumption,
the faster the ﬁrm’s cost of compensating for the worker’s eﬀort increases with the
worker’s expected utility, the sooner the worker should be terminated, and hence the
lower the upper bound on the worker’s utility.
That termination can play an important role in the determination of inequality
has not been studied in the literature. And the insight that the curvature of the
worker’s utility function is important for determining consumption and wealth in-
equality through its eﬀects on termination has not been discussed in the literature
either.
Finally, an algorithm is developed to numerically compute the equilibrium of the
model. I show that the model can be reasonably well calibrated to the U.S. data.
The calibrated model exhibits a positive wage-tenure relationship as in the data, it
also shows a much larger equilibrium wage dispersion than the equilibrium search-
matching models. These ﬁndings provide further conﬁrmation that the model might
indeed be useful for theoretical and quantitative analysis of the labor market.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 deﬁnes the contracts and labor market
equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes voluntary retirement and involuntary layoﬀs. In
Section 5, I develop an algorithm for computing the model’s equilibria. Section 6
concludes the paper. The proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 Model
Time is discrete and lasts forever. There is one perishable consumption good in each
period. The economy is populated by a sequence of overlapping generations, each of
7See for example Atkeson and Lucas (1995), Wang (1995), Kahn and Ravikumar (2002), Phelan
(2006), Smith and Wang (2006).
5which contains a continuum of workers. The total measure of workers in the economy
is equal to one. Each worker faces a time-invariant probability ∆ of surviving into
the next period. Each new generation has measure 1 − ∆, so the number of births
and the number of deaths are equal in each period. 8An individual who is born at





t−τ [v(ct) − φ(at)],
where Eτ−0 denotes the expectation taken at the beginning of period τ, β ∈ [0,1) is
the discount factor, v(ct) is the individual’s utility from consumption in period t, with
ct denoting consumption, φ(at) is the individual’s disutility from eﬀorts in period t,
with at denoting eﬀorts. Assume c ∈ R+. That is, consumption must be non-negative.
Assume a ∈ A, where A ⊆ R+ is the individual’s compact set of feasible eﬀort levels
when he is employed. The individual’s eﬀort is 0 if he is not employed, and 0 ∈ A.
The worker’s utility v(c) is strictly increasing and concave in c, and satisﬁes the Inada
condition v0(0) = ∞. Finally, the worker’s disutility φ(a) is strictly increasing in a
with φ(0) = 0.
There are η ∈ (0,1) units of ﬁrms in the model. Firms live forever and maximize
expected discounted net proﬁts. For convenience, I assume in each period, each ﬁrm
needs to employ only one worker. 9 The worker’s eﬀort is the only input in the
ﬁrm’s production function. There is moral hazard: the worker’s eﬀort is observed
by himself only. By choosing eﬀort at in period t, the worker produces a random
output in period t that is a function of at. Let θt denote the realization of this
random output. Assume θt ∈ Θ, where Θ = {θ1,θ2,...,θn} with θi < θj for i < j.
Let Xi(a) = Prob{θt = θi|at = a}, for all θi ∈ Θ, all a ∈ A and all t. The output
realization θt is a publicly observed variable.
Workers are allocated to ﬁrms through a competitive labor market where unem-
ployed workers are randomly matched with vacant ﬁrms. The ﬁrm and a newly hired
worker can enter into an employment contract that is fully dynamic. This contract
can potentially last forever, but a component of this contract is a history dependent
plan that speciﬁes whether the worker is terminated at the end of each date (or the
beginning of the next date). If the worker is terminated, he is free to go immediately
back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities, and the ﬁrm then
hires a new worker to replace him. For convenience I assume the process of termina-
tion and replacement involves no physical costs to both the ﬁrm and the worker. An
extension of the current work is to study the eﬀects of a cost of termination which
may be imposed by a policy maker.
8The OLG structure is needed here in order for me to model stationary equilibria with voluntary
retirements.
9It would not make a diﬀerence if I allow ﬁrms to employ more workers, as long as they operate
independent production technologies.
6As part of the model’s physical environment, I make three assumptions about
the contracts that are feasible between the worker and the ﬁrm. First, contracts are
subject to a non-negativity constraint that requires that all compensation payments to
the worker be non-negative. This assumption is important for generating involuntary
terminations, by making it diﬃcult for the ﬁrm to provide downward incentives to a
worker who is promised a level of expected utility that is suﬃciently low.
Second, contracts are subject to renegotiations, provided that the renegotiations
are mutually beneﬁcial and strictly beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm. This assumption puts an
additional restriction on the structure of the dynamic contract that can be signed
between the ﬁrm and the worker: the contract must be renegotiation-proof (RP).
Note that in order for renegotiations to take place, I require that they be strictly
beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm. That is, the ﬁrm can commit to the continuation of a dynamic
contract if a renegotiation can beneﬁt the worker while leaving the ﬁrm indiﬀerent.
As will become clear in the analysis of the model, since workers are identical, the
requirement that the ﬁrm be strictly better oﬀ in a renegotiation is needed in order
to make involuntary terminations part of the equilibrium contract. 10
Third, it is feasible for the ﬁrm to continue to make compensation payments to the
worker after the worker is terminated (i.e., he is replaced by a new worker), but there
is a restriction. Post-termination compensations cannot be contingent on the worker’s
performance and compensation in the ﬁrms that work for in the future, although these
compensations can be made a function of the worker’s future employment status. 11
I conclude this section with a summary of the model’s key assumptions and the
roles they play in the model. Repeated moral hazard and risk aversion motivate the
need for dynamic contracting. Risk aversion also implies a lower marginal utility of
consumption for the “richer” workers, this in turn motivates the voluntary retirements
in the model. The assumption that the worker’s consumption must be non-negative
is needed to generate involuntary layoﬀs of the “poorer” workers. Finally, as already
mentioned in the introduction, that contracts must be RP is a natural assumption
that simpliﬁes the structure of the model’s equilibrium and makes the analysis more
trackable.
3 Contracts and Equilibrium
In this section, I deﬁne and characterize a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the
environment I have just described. I take a guess-and-verify approach to ﬁnding this
equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, I begin with a conjecture about the equilibrium market en-
10See Wang (2000), Zhao (2004), and Quadrini (2004) for the existing analysis of renegotiation-
proof contracts in dynamic moral hazard. In Zhao (2004), a RP contract under the qualiﬁcation that
renegotiations must be strictly beneﬁcial to the principal is called a principal RP contract. Zhao
used this concept for a diﬀerent purpose than mine
11This assumption allows me to avoid the diﬃculty of modelling a potentially complicated dynamic
game played between the worker’s former and current employers.
7vironment in which contracting takes place. I then deﬁne an optimal contract, taking
as given that an individual contract must operate in the conjectured contracting envi-
ronment. Last, I verify that the conjectured structure of the equilibrium is consistent
with the optimal behavior of the ﬁrms and workers induced by the optimal contract.
3.1 Equilibrium Conjectured
The conjectured equilibrium of the market for contracts has the property that the
unemployed workers (those who are not employed and actively looking for jobs) were
either never employed-including the new labor market entrants, or entitled to zero
post termination compensations from former employers.
This conjectured property of the labor market equilibrium implies the following.
First, an unemployed worker’s compensation from his current employer is his total
compensation. Second, all unemployed workers are identical in all forward looking
senses: They each have zero assets, facing the same probability of obtaining employ-
ment, and would be oﬀered the same contract upon obtaining a new job.
Given the above, I can now deﬁne the equilibrium market, which individual ﬁrms
take as given when they solve their optimal contracting problems, as a tuple (π,V ,V∗),
where π denotes the probability with which an unemployed worker is matched with
a hiring ﬁrm in equilibrium, V denotes the expected utility that a new job oﬀers in
equilibrium, and ﬁnally, V∗ denotes the beginning of period expected utility of the
unemployed workers in equilibrium .
3.2 Contracts
I now proceed to deﬁne a dynamic contract, taking as given that it operates in a
labor market that has the conjectured property I have just described. I follow Green
(1987) and Spear and Srivastava (1987) to use the worker’s expected utility as a state
variable to summarize the history of the worker’s output. This allows me to write a








(a(V ), ci(V ),Vi(V )), ∀V ∈ Φr





where V denotes the worker’s expected utility at the beginning of a period: the state
variable. The set Φ = Φr
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Obviously, Vmin is the minimum expected utility of a worker that is feasible in the
model, for the worker is free to choose to stay out of the labor market, or to be
employed but make eﬀort 0, to obtain Vmin.
8The state space Φ is partitioned into two subsets, Φr and Φf, with Φr ∩ Φf = ∅.
This deﬁnes the contract’s termination rule: If V ∈ Φf, then the worker is terminated;
if V ∈ Φr, the worker is retained. Now if the worker is terminated, g(V ) denotes the
termination contract he receives from the ﬁrm in the termination state V ∈ Φf. If the
worker is retained, that is, if V ∈ Φr, then a(V ) denotes the worker’s recommended
eﬀort in the current period; ci(V ) denotes the worker’s compensation in the current
period if his output is θi; and ﬁnally, Vi(V ) denotes the worker’s expected utility at
the beginning of the next period, conditional on his output being θi in the current
period.
The contract σ is said to be feasible if for all V ∈ Φr, a(V ) ∈ A, ci(V ) ≥ 0,
Vi(V ) ∈ Φ; and for all V ∈ Φf, all post termination compensation payments to
the worker that are dictated by the termination contract g(V ) are non-negative.
Remember a termination contract must be a step function of the worker’s employment
status after termination. Let G denote the set of all feasible termination contracts.
The contract σ must satisfy a promise-keeping constraint. This constraint requires
that the structure of σ be consistent with the deﬁnition of V being the worker’s
expected utility at the beginning of a given period, for all V ∈ Φ. In particular, the
termination contract g(V ) must be designed to guarantee that the worker who leaves
the ﬁrm with an expected utility entitlement V is indeed to receive expected utility
equal to V . That is, given g(V ), and given what the market has to oﬀer to the worker
after termination, the worker’s expected utility must be equal to V when he leaves




Xi(a(V ))[v(ci(V )) − φ(a(V )) + β∆Vi(V )], ∀V ∈ Φr, (1)
M[g(V )] = V, ∀V ∈ Φf, (2)
where equation (1) is familiar from the literature, (2) is not. In equation (1), given
that I take as given that the worker was not entitled to any post termination compen-
sation from any previous employers, ci(V ) is just the worker’s current consumption.
In equation (2), I use M(x) to denote the value of the expected utility that an ar-
bitrary feasible termination contract x ∈ G delivers to the worker, given the market
that x takes as given. That is, the worker’s expected utility is M(x) if he leaves the
ﬁrm with termination contract x. At this stage, I take the termination value function
M : G → R as given. I will later specify the form of M.
A contract σ is called incentive compatible if
X
i





0)[v(ci(V )) − φ(a
0) + β∆Vi(V )], ∀V ∈ Φr, ∀a
0 ∈ A. (3)
9Notice that the promise-keeping constraint is deﬁned for all V ∈ Φ, whereas the
incentive constraint need only be deﬁned for all V ∈ Φr.
Given σ, and given the market(where the worker goes back to after termination)
that the contract must take as given, I can calculate the ﬁrm’s expected utility U(V )
for each V ∈ Φ. I then refer to U : Φ → R as the value function generated by the
contract σ (again, conditional on the market that σ takes as given).
3.3 Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
I will call a contract σ renegotiation-proof (RP) if it supports a value function that
is RP. Note that, as is the deﬁnition of the contract σ, the deﬁnition of the RP-ness
of σ is also conditional on the market that σ takes as given. In the following, I ﬁrst
deﬁne what it means to say that a value function is RP. I then deﬁne what it means
to say that a contract supports a RP value function.
A RP value function will be deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of an operator on the functional
space
B ≡ {U : Φr ∪ Φf → R|Φr,Φf ⊆ [Vmin,Vmax), Φr ∩ Φf = ∅}.
The set B includes all the value functions I need to consider. These value functions
each have two components to its domain: one associated with continuation (Φr), one
associated with termination (Φf). I say that two value functions in B are equal if they
have the same Φr and Φf and the same values for each V ∈ Φr
S
Φf. Value functions
that have the same graph but not the same domain partition are considered diﬀerent
value functions. In the following, I will use U(Φr,Φf) to denote a value function in
B whose domain is partitioned into Φr and Φf.
Let C : G → R+, where for each g ∈ G, C(g) denotes the cost of the termination
contract g to the ﬁrm: the expected discounted payments that the ﬁrm makes to the
worker after termination. Given that compensation payments must be non-negative,
I have
C(g) ≥ 0, ∀g ∈ G.
I now consider the ﬁrm’s optimization problem, taking a dynamic programing
approach. At the beginning of period, the ﬁrm takes its value function U(Φr,Φf) ∈ B
as given, when making choices for the current period. At the beginning of the period,
the ﬁrm also takes as given the expected utility of the worker, V . The ﬁrm has two
choices: to retain the worker, or to terminate him. If the ﬁrm retains the worker, its
value is determined by









a ∈ A; ci ≥ 0, Vi ∈ Φr
[
Φf, ∀i, (5)
10Vi ≥ V∗, ∀i, (6)
X
i





0) + β∆Vi], ∀a




Xi(a)[v(ci) − φ(a) + β∆Vi]. (8)
That is, Ur(V ) gives the value of the ﬁrm conditional on retaining the current worker.
Equation (5) is a self-enforcing constraint: in any ex post state of the world, the
worker is weakly better oﬀ staying in with the contract than leaving the contract.
Obviously, if the worker quits the contract unilaterally, then he would not receive
any compensation from the ﬁrm, as it is not optimal for the ﬁrm. This then implies
that any worker who quits an ongoing contract would receive expected utility V∗. 12
Equation (7) is the incentive constraint, requiring that the worker is weakly better oﬀ
making the required eﬀort. Equation (8) is the promise-keeping constraint. Equation
(4) reﬂects the fact that with probability (1 − ∆) the existing worker will die, in
which case the ﬁrm must go back to the labor market to hire a new worker, and then
chooses an optimal starting expected utility V 0 ∈ Φr for the new worker to maximize
the value of the ﬁrm. This new worker has areservation utility V∗.
Obviously, Ur(V ) is not well deﬁned for all V . Let ˜ Φr be the set of all V s such
that there exists {a,(ci,Vi)} that satisﬁes the constraints (6)-(9). Then Ur : ˜ Φ → R
gives the ﬁrm’s value function conditional on retaining the worker.
I next consider what happens if the ﬁrm terminates the worker. Remember a
terminated worker receives a termination contract g from the ﬁrm. To obtain promise-
keeping, the value of g to the terminated worker must be equal to V . That is, it must
hold that M(g) = V .
Notice ﬁrst that if V < V∗, then because compensation must be non-negative,
there is no g ∈ G that could deliver V to the terminated worker. I therefore must
consider only the case of V ∈ [V∗,Vmax).
Lemma 1 For all V ∈ [V∗,Vmax), there exists a termination compensation contract
g ∈ G such that M(g) = V.
With this lemma, for all V ∈ [V∗,Vmax), the ﬁrm’s value is given by










M(g) = V. (10)
12A specially case here is Vi = V∗. In this case the worker is indiﬀerent between staying in or
quiting the contract.
11The function Uf(·) gives the values of the ﬁrm conditional on terminating the worker.
Given the values Ur(V ) and Uf(V ), the ﬁrm makes the optimal choice between
retaining and terminating the working by determining
TU(V ) = max{Ur(V ),Uf(V )}, (11)
the ﬁrm’s value after optimizing between retention and termination.
Since Ur(·) and Uf(·) don’t have the same domains, I must be careful about the
domain of TU(·). Let Φ0 = e Φr
S
[V∗,Vmax). Extend Ur(·) from e Φr to Φ0 by letting
Ur(V ) = −∞ for all V ∈ Φ0 − e Φr. Extend Uf(·) from [V∗,Vmax) to Φ0 by letting
Uf(V ) = −∞ for all V ∈ Φ0 − [V∗,Vmax). Then, for each V ∈ Φ0, the function TU(·)
is deﬁned.
Next, in order to think of TU(·) as an element in the space B, I must partition the
domain of TU(·) into two subsets, Φ0
r and Φ0
f, the former associated with retention,
the latter with termination. This is given by
Φ
0
r = {V ∈ Φ
0 : Ur(V ) ≥ Uf(V )}, (12)
Φ
0
f = {V ∈ Φ
0 : Ur(V ) < Uf(V )}. (13)
I have now ﬁnished formulating the ﬁrm’s optimization problem.
Since the ﬁrm’s value function will be required to be renegotiation-proof, I now
deﬁne an the operator on B that describes the procedure of obtaining renegotiation-
proof values from a given value function in B. This operator is denoted P. Again, let




f → R is deﬁned by
Φ
0
k = {V ∈ Φk : 6 ∃V
0 ∈ Φ suchthat V
0 ≥ V, U(V
0) > U(V )}, k = r,f; 13
and







Thus the operator P basically takes away the Pareto dominated utility pairs from the
graph of U.
I am now ready to formally deﬁne a renegotiation-proof value function.
Deﬁnition 2 Let U(Φr,Φf) ∈ B. U is said to be (internally) renegotiation-proof if
it satisﬁes the following functional equation:
U = PTU, (14)
where T and P are both operators on B, as deﬁned in the above.
13I will use the following notation in the remainder of the paper. I say that a pair of expected
utilities (V,Z) is Pareto dominated by another pair of expected utilities (V 0,Z0), denoted (V 0,Z0) >p
(V,Z), if and only if V 0 ≥ V, Z0 > Z. Here, V and V 0 denote expected utilities of the worker, Z
and Z0 expected utilities of the ﬁrm.
12Deﬁnition 2 is in the spirit of Ray (1994), where the operator T gives the set of
all optimal expected utility pairs that are generated by U, and the operator P then
gives the subset of the graph of TU such that each utility pair in this subset is not
Pareto dominated by any other utility pair in the graph of TU. 14
The following characterization for the optimal termination contract g(V ) is straight-
forward to see.
Lemma 3 C(g(V∗)) = 0 and C(g(V )) > 0 for all V > V∗.
The ﬁrst part of Lemma 3 holds because the contract g that solves problem (10)-
(11) for V = V∗ must have C(g) = 0. The second part of the lemma holds because,
if C(g) = 0, then M(g) = V∗ < V .
Let
V ≡ arg max
V 0∈Φr, V 0≥V∗
Ur(V
0). (15)
That is, V achieves the highest value of Ur(V ). In other words, suppose the ﬁrm has
just hired a new worker and is free to choose a level of starting expected utility for
this new worker to maximize the value of the ﬁrm, subject to the participation of the
worker. Then the new worker’s starting expected utility should be V . 15
With the deﬁnition of V , Lemma 3 implies
Uf(V∗) = Ur(V ). (16)
The equation says that at any ex post date, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between ﬁring a
worker at V∗ and retaining him at V . Remember I assumed in Section 2 that in this
situation the ﬁrm can commit to an ex ante decision to ﬁre the worker, rather than
renegotiating the contract and moving the worker from V∗ to V . This assumption
can be justiﬁed, for otherwise the worker’s ex ante incentives would be distorted, the
ﬁrm would not be able to obtain U(V ) ex ante, while the ﬁrm is not strictly better
oﬀ ex post either.
I now proceed to characterize the set Φ, the state space of the dynamic contract.
Lemma 4 With a RP value function it holds that
(i) e Φr = [v(0) − φ(0) + β∆V∗,Vmax).
(ii) Φ = {V∗}
S
[V ,Vmax).
14There are several other ways to deﬁne the sets of renegotiation-proof payoﬀs for inﬁnitely re-
peated games. Ray’s is a natural extension of the concept of renegotiation-proof payoﬀ sets in
ﬁnitely repeated games to inﬁnitely repeated games. Ray’s concept was used by Zhao (2004) to
study renegotiation-proof dynamic contracts with moral hazard.
15Note that in equation (15) I am implicitly assuming that V is uniquely determined, for technical
convenience. The case of a non-unique V can be explicitly treated, by assuming that the ﬁrm would
give the worker the highest expected utility that attains the maximum ﬁrm value.
13Note V ≥ V∗. If V∗ < V , then Φ is not convex: any expected utility that is strictly
between V∗ and V is not RP.
Deﬁnition 5 Let U(Φr ∪ Φf) ∈ B be a RP value function. I say that a contract
σ = {(a(V ),ci(V ),Vi(V )), V ∈ Φr; g(V ), V ∈ Φf} supports U(Φr,Φr), and is hence
RP, if
(i) {a(V ),ci(V ),Vi(V )} is a solution to the maximization problem (5)-(9) for all
V ∈ Φr, and g(V ) is a solution to the maximization problem (10)-(11) for all V ∈ Φf;
and
(ii) V ∈ Φr if and only if Ur(V ) ≥ Uf(V ).
Obviously, for any RP value function, there is at least one RP contract that
supports it. Also, by deﬁnition, if a value function is RP, then it is weakly decreasing.
3.4 Equilibrium
Workers in the model are divided into three groups at the beginning of any period:
those who are currently employed; those who are unemployed (not employed and
looking for employment, including the new labor market entrants); and those who
are not in the labor force (not employed and not looking for employment). As the
economy moves into the middle of the period (that is, after the labor market is
closed), some of the unemployed will become employed as they match with vacant
ﬁrms. When the period ends, a fraction of the employed workers will be terminated,
among them a fraction become unemployed, looking actively for employment, the rest
decide to stay out of the labor market, either temporarily or permanently.16
Terminations are divided into two types. I call a termination involuntary if the
worker’s expected utility is strictly below V upon termination, i.e., V ∈ Φf and
V < V . A termination is called voluntary if it is not involuntary, that is, V ∈ Φf
and V > V . Notice that by the deﬁnition of V , V 6∈ Φf. Thus, if an involuntary
termination occurs, the terminated worker would like to work for an expected utility
that is lower than what is oﬀered to the new worker the ﬁrm hires. This is not the
case in a voluntary termination.
Proposition 6 If V ∈ Φf and V < V , then C[g(V )] = 0.
This is easy to show. Suppose C[g(V )] > 0 for some V that satisﬁes V ∈ Φf and
V < V . Then the optimal contract has
U(V ) = Uf(V ) = Ur(V ) − C[g(V )] < Ur(V ). (17)
This implies (V ,Ur(V )) >p (V,U(V )) and so the contract is not renegotiation-proof.
A contradiction.
16As will become clear later, all withdraws from the labor market are permanent in this model.
14Note that in equation (17), the left hand side of the inequality is the value of the
ﬁrm if the worker is terminated; the right hand side the value of the ﬁrm if the ﬁrm
retains the worker, promising him expected utility V , and taking back his termination
contract g(V ). So the ﬁrm and the worker can both do strictly better by moving the
worker’s utility from V to V . Thus the contract is not RP.
Because all termination contracts must specify non-negative payments from the
ﬁrm to the workers in all periods, C[g(V )] = 0 holds if and only if the worker receives
zero payments from the ﬁrm in all periods after termination. In turn, this implies
that upon an involuntary termination, the worker’s utility must be equal to V∗. This
property of the equilibrium contract is included in my next proposition, Proposition
7, which also shows that, with the equilibrium contract, as long as the worker remains
employed, his expected utility will be greater than his starting expected utility V .
Now suppose V∗ < V , as will be shown to be true later in the paper. Then only in
the case of an involuntary termination, the worker’s expected utility is strictly below
V .
Proposition 7 The following holds with the equilibrium contract.
(i) V ≥ V for all V ∈ Φr.
(ii) Suppose V∗ < V . Then V∗ ∈ Φf; Moreover, if V ∈ Φf and V < V , then
V = V∗.
So far I have conﬁrmed the conjecture that in equilibrium, all workers who are
involuntarily terminated are entitled to zero compensation payments (current and
future) as long as they remain unemployed. Thus in the forward looking sense, all
workers who are involuntarily unemployed at the beginning of a period (including the
new labor market entrants, workers who were never employed, and workers who were
involuntarily terminated) are essentially identical. They each have expected utility
V∗, would like to obtain employment, and will be employed in any given period with
the same probability and with the same contract.
Let π ∈ [0,1] denote the equilibrium probability with which a worker who is
unemployed at the beginning of a period becomes employed during the period (the
rate of hiring out of unemployment). So if π < 1, then in equilibrium some workers
will remain unemployed throughout the period.
Proposition 8 Suppose π < 1. Then voluntarily terminated workers are never re-
employed.
So once terminated voluntarily, the worker will never go back to the labor market.
He is retired, out of the labor force permanently.
Propositions 5-7 greatly simplify the structure of the termination contract. Sup-
pose π < 1. Since a voluntarily terminated worker is never reemployed, the ter-
mination contract g(V ) is simply a sequence of constant compensation equal to
15v−1[(1 − β∆)V ] paid to the worker until he dies. This implies the following equi-
librium termination conditions for the ﬁrm:




0, V = V∗,
v−1[(1−β∆)V ]
1−β∆ , V > V .
(19)
Notice Uf(·) is strictly decreasing over the interval [V ,Vmax).
Note that by Lemma 4, any V that falls in the interval (V∗,V ) is not an element in
the state space of the equilibrium contract, Φr ∪ Φf. I will leave the oﬀ-equilibrium-
path portion of the cost function C(g(V )) : V ∈ (V∗,V ) unspeciﬁed. This does not
aﬀect the analysis, what matters is C(g(V )) > 0 for all V ∈ (V∗,V ), which I already
know.
Propositions 6-8 also allow me to specify the worker’s termination value function
M(g). By the propositions, I need only focus on termination contracts that take the
form of a constant stream of compensation pay after termination, denote this stream
by {cg} for a given termination contract g. Then I have
M(g) =
(
V∗, cg = 0,
v(cg)−φ(0)
1−β∆ , cg > 0.
(20)
Notice that for all V ∈ Φf with V < V , Uf(V ) = Ur(V ). That is, each time a
worker is involuntarily terminated, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between ﬁring him (so the
worker will receive expected utility of V∗) and retaining him and to restart him with
the promised utility V . This is the reason the model requires that renegotiations be
strictly beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm in order for them to happen. Otherwise, the ﬁrm would
face a dilemma which is beyond what I can address in the current paper. Note that
this is not a problem in the case of a voluntary termination, where the ﬁrm is always
strictly better oﬀ ex post to start with a new worker than to stay with the old.
To summarize, if a worker is terminated involuntarily, then he will receive no
payments from the ﬁrm after termination and hence his expected utility must be
equal to V∗. If the termination is voluntary, then the worker will receive in each
future period from the ﬁrm a constant payment equal to v−1[(1 − β∆)V ] and he
never goes back to the market again. Moreover, if π < 1, then all new hires will
start with the same expected utility V . These results greatly simplify the structure
of the market for contracts, making it ready now for me to formulate the deﬁnition
of equilibrium.
I will focus on the model’s stationary equilibria in this paper. The ﬁrst equilibrium
condition is the following stationarity condition for V∗:
V∗ = πV + (1 − π)[v(0) − φ(0) + β∆V∗]
16or
V∗ =
πV + (1 − π)[v(0) − φ(0)]
1 − (1 − π)β∆
(21)
Since voluntarily terminated workers are never re-employed, I will call them retired
workers. Let µV denote the measure of the retired workers at the beginning of each
period. Since retired workers do not participate in the labor market, this number is
constant before and right after the labor market is closed.
Let µI denote the measure of the unemployed workers at the beginning of a period
but after the labor market is closed. This includes workers who have never been
employed and workers who were terminated in a previous period with C[g(V )] = 0.
Each of these workers have expected utility V∗.
Finally, let µE : Φr → [0,1] denote the distribution of the expected utilities of
the employed workers after the labor market is closed but before production occurs: R
Φr dµE(V ) = 1. Note the total number of these workers is η.
Let ξ denote the aggregate turnover rate: the fraction of employed workers (those







where for each V ∈ Φr,
Ω(V ) ≡ {θi : Vi(V ) ∈ Φf}
is the set of all realizations of the current state of the worker’s output θ in which the
worker with expected utility V will be terminated. Therefore, the aggregate labor
market turnover is ξη. This is also the number of newly employed workers in each
period (the ﬂow from unemployment to employment).
In addition, for all V ∈ Φr, I let
ΩI(V ) = {θi : Vi(V ) ∈ Φf, Vi(V ) < V }
and
ΩV(V ) = {θi : Vi(V ) ∈ Φf, Vi(V ) ≥ V }.
So ΩI(V ) is the set of the realizations of θ for which the worker is terminated in-
voluntarily, conditional on the worker’s beginning-of-period expected utility being V ;
and ΩV(V ) is the set of the realizations of θ upon which the worker is terminated













Xi(a(V ))dµE(V ). (23)
That is, ξI is the fraction of the employed workers to transition to involuntary unem-
ployment each period, and ξV is the fraction of the employed workers to transition to
retirement each period. Clearly, ξI,ξV ≥ 0 and ξ = ξI + ξV.
Deﬁnition 9 A stationary equilibrium with unemployment is a vector
{π, V∗, V , σ
∗, (ξI, ξV), (µE,µV,µI)}
where
(i) Given π, V∗, V , and (µE,µV,µI), σ∗ is an optimal contract;
(ii) V is given by (15);
(iii) V∗ is given by (21);
(iv)
π =
η[(1 − ∆) + ∆ξI + ∆ξV]
(1 − ∆) + ∆µI + ∆ηξI
< 1;
(v) ξI and ξV are given by (22) and (23);
(vi) µE, µV and µI satisfy the following stationarity conditions:
µI = (1 − π)[(1 − ∆) + ∆µI + ∆ηξI], (24)
µV = ∆µV + ∆ηξV, (25)
µE = Γ(µE), (26)
where the operator Γ maps the distribution of the expected utilities of the employed
workers in the current period into that in the next period, as dictated by the law of
motion for V ∈ Φr (i.e.,{V ∗
i (V ), V ∈ Φr}), the equilibrium starting expected utility
V , and the survival rate ∆.
Note that µI is the model’s equilibrium unemployment measured in the middle of
the period, after the labor market closes and before production ends. The model’s
unemployment measured at the beginning of the period and before the labor market
opens should then be equal to (1−∆)+∆µI +∆ηξI. And, at the beginning of period,
the economy’s total number of vacant jobs is η[(1 − ∆) + ∆ξI + ∆ξV]. By deﬁnition
then, µI must be the diﬀerence between the number of unemployed workers and the
number of vacant jobs; this gives




18This condition of identity can be used in Deﬁnition 9 to reduce the number of en-
dogenous variables by one.
By deﬁnition, µI > 0 if and only if π < 1. With µI > 0, the number of workers
looking for jobs is greater than the number of vacant jobs, giving the hiring ﬁrms
an upper hand in the market. Although I will not discuss the case of µI = 0 in this
paper, it should be clear from (27) that for η suﬃciently small, µI > 0 and π < 1
must hold in any equilibrium of the model.
I now conclude this section with a remark. The variables that are endogenously de-
termined in the model’s equilibrium include the economy’s aggregate unemployment
(µI) and aggregate retirement (µV), the unemployed workers’ job ﬁnding probability
(π), the aggregate labor turnover (ξη), the ﬂow from employment to unemployment
(ξIη), the ﬂow from employment to retirement (ξVη), the economy’s labor force par-
ticipation rate (1 − µV), the distribution of expected utilities of the retired workers,
the distribution of current wages and expected utilities of the employed workers, the
expected utility of the unemployed workers (V∗), and the starting expected utility of
newly hired workers (V ). These include the majority the labor market variables that
are commonly viewed as important. This is a signiﬁcant advantage my model oﬀers,
especially given the model’s tight setup which assumes ﬁxed numbers of homogeneous
workers and ﬁrms.
4 Voluntary and Involuntary Terminations
A necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium involuntary termination and
involuntary unemployment is V∗ < V . In addition, if this condition holds, then all
the unemployed (if any) are involuntarily unemployed. Notice that if the economy
has no unemployment, that is, π = 1, then V = V∗ by equation (19).
Proposition 10 Suppose in equilibrium there is unemployment (i.e.,π < 1). Suppose
the equilibrium is not degenerate. That is, suppose the employed worker’s eﬀorts are
positive in at least some states of the world with the equilibrium contract. Then
V > V∗.
Because the expected utilities of all unemployed workers are equal to V∗, Propo-
sition 10 says that if the equilibrium is not degenerate, then all unemployment is
involuntary.
I now proceed to show that involuntary termination does occur in equilibrium.
More speciﬁcally, Proposition 13 shows that in the case of two output and two eﬀort
levels, the equilibrium contract has V ∗
1 (V ) = V∗. That is, the newly hired worker is
terminated immediately after he produces a low output. I start with a deﬁnition and
then a lemma.
Deﬁnition 11 Let U : Φ(= Φr
S
Φf) → R be a value function. A utility pair (V,Z)









or there exists g ∈ G that satisﬁes equation (11) and




In the following, I will let G(U) denote the set of all utility pairs (V,Z) generated
by U. I will let Graph(U) denote the graph of value function U. By deﬁnition then,
Graph(TU) ⊆ G(U).
Lemma 12 Let U : Φ → R. If there exists (V,Z) ∈ G(U) such that (V,Z) 6∈
Graph(U) and (V,Z) is not Pareto dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U), then U
is not RP.
Lemma 12 provides a necessary condition for the RP-ness of a contract. In order
to show that a value function is not RP, I need only construct an utility pair (V,Z)
that is generated by U but not Pareto dominated by any utility pair that belongs to
the graph of U. 17
Proposition 13 Let Θ = {θ1,θ2} and A = {aL,aH} with aL < aH. Assume with the
optimal contract a(V ) = aH, and assume the ﬁrm’s value function Ur(V ) is concave.18
Then ΩI(V ) = {θ1} : The newly hired worker is terminated immediately if he produces
a low output.
It is tempting to extend Proposition 13 to the more general case of arbitrarily
many output and eﬀort levels. The diﬃculty lies in the fact that with more than two
output and eﬀort levels, it is much more diﬃcult to evaluate the changes in the values
of the ﬁrm and the worker due to a change in compensation or termination strategy.
In the numerical example in Section 5 where the model is calibrated to the U.S. data,
the worker’s eﬀort is allowed to take any non-negative real value, and the computed
optimal termination policy is consistent with the prediction of Proposition 3.
My next proposition gives a suﬃcient condition for voluntary termination. It
states that voluntary termination must occur if the worker’s expected utility is suf-
ﬁciently high. The logic is rather simple. The risk averse worker has decreasing
17Note that Lemma 12 is perhaps more than just being useful for the proof a speciﬁc result in this
model. The logic behind Lemma 12 is a general one and does not depend on the speciﬁc structure
of the contract I study in this paper. However, to elaborate on the signiﬁcance of Lemma 12 is
obviously beyond the scope of this paper.
18This can always be obtained by allowing the ﬁrm to randomize over two employment contracts
{a,(ci,Vi)} in equation (5).
20marginal utility of consumption. His eﬀort thus becomes increasingly more expensive
for the ﬁrm to compensate for when his expected utility increases (he gets “richer”).
When the worker’s utility becomes suﬃciently high, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ replacing
this worker with a new worker whose utility is lower and so his eﬀorts are less ex-
pensive. Mathematically, this can be illustrated in a static compensation problem
with no uncertainties. Imagine a ﬁrm oﬀers a worker compensation c to make eﬀort
a(> 0). Suppose the worker is endowed with consumption c0. For the worker to be
fully compensated, c must satisfy
v(c0 + c) − v(c0) = φ(a) − φ(0).
The right hand side of this equation is constant while the left hand side is increasing
in c but decreasing in c0. So c increases as c0 increases. Moreover, given that v is
concave, c must be convex in c0.
Proposition 14 Assume (v−1)0(x) → ∞ as x → v(∞). Assume with the optimal
contract the worker’s eﬀort a(V ) is bounded from below by some a > 0. 19 Then
V ∈ Φf for all V ≥ V ∗, where V ∗ ∈ (V ,Vmax) solves
v
−1[(1 − β∆)V + φ(a)] − v
−1[(1 − β∆)V ] = C, (29)
where C is a constant in V .
So in equilibrium the employed worker’s expected utility is bounded from above
by V ∗. This, together with the fact V ≥ V for all V ∈ Φr from Proposition 7, gives
Corollary 15 Φr ⊆ [V ,V ∗].
Equation (29) shows that V ∗ depends critically on the curvature of the inverse
of worker’s utility function v, v−1. Other parameters of the model ﬁxed, V ∗ is lower
if (v−1)0 is higher. This is consistent with the intuition I illustrated before I stated
the proposition. The function (v−1)0 measures how fast the cost of compensating the
worker’s eﬀort increases with the worker’s expected utility. Therefore a steeper (v−1)
implies a worker whose expected utility has been increasing should be terminated
sooner-at a lower expected utility.
Long-run consumption and utility distributions have been a major focus of interest
in the literature of dynamic contracting with private information. In Green(1987)
and Atkeson and Lucas (1992), optimal dynamic incentives imply inequality grows
over time without bound. Other authors (Atkeson and Lucas, 1995; Wang, 1995;
Kahn and Ravikumar, 2002; Smith and Wang, 2006; Phelan, 2006) have shown that
eﬃcient dynamic incentives do not necessarily imply unlimited inequality. This paper
19Alternatively, I could directly assume that the employed worker’s eﬀort is bounded from below
by some a.
21contributes to the literature by showing that incentive-induced inequality can be
bounded by optimal termination. This is done in a model of decentralized market
for dynamic contracts, and the bounds on the distribution of expected utilities are
endogenously determined. Moreover, a speciﬁc upper bound of the employed worker’s
utility is derived analytically, and is shown to depend on the curvature of the worker’s
utility function.
5 Algorithm and Simulation
5.1 Algorithm
Notice that the only interaction between an individual RP contract and the labor
market is through V∗, the expected utility of unemployed workers. Notice also that
once the RP contract is given, the equilibrium measures and distributions, and hence
V∗, are determined. Given these observations, I now construct an algorithm, which
is based on an iteration procedure on V∗, for computing an equilibrium of the model
economy.
Algorithm 16 Step 1. For each x ∈ [Vmin,Vmax), replace the constraint V 0 ≥ V∗ by
V 0 ≥ x in the ﬁrm’s optimization problem (5)-(11), solve the Bellman equation for
the RP contract, denote it σ(x).
Step 2. For each given x, use σ(x) to compute the optimal starting expected utility
V (x) for the newly hired worker. Compute the stationary measures and distributions
σ(x) induces. In particular, let π(x) denote the stationary probability of obtaining
employment for the unemployed.
Step 3. For each x, compute the value of
f(x) = π(x)V (x) + (1 − π(x))[v(0) − φ(0) + β∆x]. (30)
Step 4. Find V∗ such that f(V∗) = V∗.
Lemma 17 f(Vmin) − Vmin > 0.
Lemma 18 V (x) = x for x suﬃciently close to Vmax.
Lemma 19 For x suﬃciently close to Vmax it holds that
f(x) − x ≤ 0. (31)
Proposition 20 A stationary equilibrium of the model exists and can be computed
using Algorithm 16 if V (·) is continuous.
225.2 Simulation
In this section, I calibrate the model to the U.S. data. I let a period be a quarter.
I set β = 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is roughly 5%. I set the worker
survival rate to be ∆ = 0.995, implying an expected worker life of 50 years. I
let v(c) − φ(a) = log(c0 + c) − a0a2, where c,a ≥ 0, and a0 and c0 are positive
constants. I assume two output levels so Θ = {θ1,θ2}. I assume X1(a) = exp(−ψa)
and X2(a) = 1 − exp(−ψa), where ψ > 0. This gives me the following set of free
parameters of the model: a0,c0,θ1,θ2,ψ,η. Normalization allows me to set ψ = 1
and θ1 = 0. I set η = 0.6336 so that 63.36% of the population is employed in the
model, similar to that in the U.S. data. 20 I then choose a0, c0 and θ2 to target a
measure of unemployment of 0.0342 and of a measure of not-in-the-labor-force equal
to 0.332. Speciﬁcally, by setting a0 = 2.5, c0 = 0.65, and θ2 = 2.75, the model
gives a measure of unemployed workers of 0.05031, and the measure of not-in-the-
labor-force of 0.31609. In the simulated model, the equilibrium starting expected
utility, V , is equal to −0.32932, strictly greater than the worker’s reservation utility
V∗ = −0.33237, as Proposition 10 predicts.
Figure 1 shows the value functions Ur(V ) and Uf(V ), where the horizontal axis
represents V , the plus signs represent Uf(V ) and the dots represent Ur(V ). Notice
the worker is terminated (Uf(V ) > Ur(V )) if and only V is suﬃciently low or it is
suﬃciently high. Figure 2 shows the law of motion for the worker’s promised utility
{Vi(V )} where the horizontal axis represents V , the lower curve is V1(V ) and the
higher curve V2(V ). Figures 1 and 2 together indicate that the worker is terminated
with probability one after either a suﬃciently large number of high outputs or a
suﬃciently large number of low outputs, regardless of where the employed worker is
initially.
Figure 3 shows the worker’s current compensation as a function of his expected
utility V and output θ, where the plus signs represent c1(V ) and the dots represent
c2(V ). Figure 4 shows the worker’s eﬀort as a function of V . Notice the inverted U
shape. This is consistent with the idea that the worker is more diﬃcult to motivate
when he is too rich or too poor.
For each worker, in the long-run, termination occurs with probability one. This
implies an ergodic distribution of promised utilities over a bounded range, following
immediately from the fact that the sequence of promised utilities lies in a compact set,
so that the cluster points of the sequence constitute the support of the ergodic distri-
bution, while the relative frequencies with which each cluster point is hit constitute
the ergodic probabilities. One can also establish this result directly by noting that
the incentive mechanism constitutes a random walk with reﬂecting barriers. Figure 5,
where the horizontal axis represents the worker’s expected utility, shows the station-
20The Current Population Survey provides monthly data on employment, unemployment and not-
in-the-labor-force, for the period between January 1994 and December 2003. The computed average
measures of employment, unemployment, and not-in-the-labor-force are 0.6336, 0.0342, and 0.332,
respectively.
23ary distribution of the workers: the employed workers in the middle, the unemployed
in the left, and the retired in the right.
Consider a new worker starts out with the equilibrium starting expected utility
V . If he produces a low output in the ﬁrst period, then he is ﬁred immediately.
If he produces a high output in the ﬁrst period, then his current compensation is
positive, he is retained and promised a utility strictly higher than V . Suppose in the
following periods the worker continues to produce high outputs. Then his expected
utility continues to rise, current compensation increases, and he eventually retires
with a termination contract that is equivalent to a stream of constant compensation
payments. On the other hand, suppose we follow a worker who starts with a relatively
high expected utility and produces a sequence of low outputs. Then in each of the
following periods, his current compensation is lower, and his expected utility declines,
and he is eventually laid oﬀ involuntarily.
Consider the relationship between the worker’s wage and his tenure with the ﬁrm
in the model. From the law of motion for the employed worker’s expected utility that
Figure 2 depicts, conditional on a longer tenure at the ﬁrm, on average the workers’
expected utility should be higher. As higher expected utilities translate into higher
compensations, there is therefore a positive relationship between wage and tenure
in the simulated model. The existing literature has provided interesting theories
for explaining the observed positive wage-tenure relationship (e.g., Jovanovic 1979;
Lazear 1979; Burdett and Coles, 2003; Moscarini, 2005). Unlike mine, these theories
are not based on dynamic incentives under private information.
A newer worker faces a higher probability of involuntary lay oﬀ than an older
worker. Speciﬁcally, a fresh new worker is laid oﬀ immediately after one low output,
as Proposition 13 predicts; whereas it can take many periods of low output before an
old worker is ﬁred, depending on where his expected utility is initially. On the other
hand, a worker with a longer tenure with the ﬁrm (whose promised expected utility
is likely to be higher than that of a worker with a shorter tenure) on average has a
higher probability to retire and leave the labor force.
Figures 3 and 5 indicate large wage and utility dispersions across employed workers
that the model can generate. The stochastic production technology, combined with
the mechanism of dynamic incentives and risk sharing, implies that homogeneous
workers that start with the same expected utility tend to fan out over time in utility
and compensation. This mechanism for generating equilibrium wage dispersion is
diﬀerent from that of the equilibrium search-matching models (e.g., Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998; Moscarini, 2003). Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006) argue that
standard search-matching models can generate only a very small, 3.6%, diﬀerential
between the average wage and the lowest wage paid in the labor market. 21 This
numerical exercise shows that our model has the potential of providing an alternative
equilibrium framework for accounting for the observed large wage dispersion.
21The observed Mm ratio–the ratio between the average wage and lowest wage paid– is at least
twenty times larger than what the model observes.
246 Conclusion
I have constructed and studied an equilibrium model of the labor market where
contracts are fully dynamic, job turnover is endogenous, workers terminated from
their current jobs are free to go back to the labor market to look for new employment
or to stay out of the labor market. The center of the model is an optimal termination
mechanism that governs the timing and type of the separation of workers and ﬁrms.
In equilibrium, this optimal termination mechanism appears in two diﬀerent faces,
involuntary layoﬀ and voluntary retirement.
Compared to the models of eﬃciency wages and the models of equilibrium search
and matching, this paper oﬀers an alternative framework for equilibrium labor market
analysis. The contribution to the theory of dynamic contracting is that I model
equilibrium multiple transitions between dynamic contracts. An important insight is
that termination limits incentive induced inequality.
For my purpose in this paper, I have constructed the model to have a ﬁxed number
of jobs. This implies that the demand for labor is ﬁxed in my model. 22 An extension
of the model is to endogenize the demand for labor. This can be done by assuming
a competitive supply of ﬁrms who are free to enter and exit the market, subject to a
non-negative cost of staying in operation, as in for example Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994); the model is then closed by imposing that the value of entering the market
is zero. Obviously, such an extension is not essential for my purpose in this paper.
It would not alter any of the qualitative characterizations of the labor market I have
presented. In fact, one could simply think of the analysis in this paper as being
conditional on the equiliberium number of ﬁrms in the more general model with free
entry and exit of ﬁrms. But such an extension would certainly make the computation
and calibration of the model more involved, as well as making the model a better
vehicle for quantitative analysis.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
For all c ≥ 0, let g[c] denote the termination contract that pays the worker c
units of compensation as long as the worker remains non-employed, and zero once
the worker is reemployed. Under this contract, the terminated worker will choose to




22There is also a ﬁxed number of workers in my model, but since the non-employed workers are
allowed to choose whether or not to participate in the labor market, the supply of labor is endogenous
in my model.
25or c is suﬃciently small; otherwise, he will choose to quit the labor market perma-




Suppose he stays in the labor market, that is, suppose c < c. Then the expected
utility he receives from g[c], M(g[c]), is equal to ˆ M(g[c]) which solves
ˆ M(g[c]) = u(c) − φ(0) + β∆(πV + (1 − π) ˆ M(g[c])).
where remember π(0,1) denotes the probability with which an unemployed worker is
matched with a hiring ﬁrm, V is the equilibrium starting expected utility of a new
worker. Or,
ˆ M(g[c]) =
u(c) − φ(0) + β∆πV
1 − β∆(1 − π)
.





It is straightforward to verify that
ˆ M(g[c]) = ˜ M(g[c]).
Therefore M(g[c]) is well deﬁned, strictly increasing in c with M(g[0]) = V∗ and
M(g[∞]) = Vmax. So for any V ∈ [V∗,Vmax) there exists c ≥ 0 such that M(g[c]) = V .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Observe ﬁrst that u(0) − φ(0) + β∆V∗ ≤ V∗.
I ﬁrst show V∗ ∈ Φ. Notice ﬁrst that TU(V ) is well deﬁned at V = V∗ because Uf(·)
is. Second, there cannot be a V such that (V,TU(V )) Pareto dominates (V∗,TU(V∗)),
because TU(V∗) ≥ Uf(V∗) = maxV 0∈Φr, V 0≥V∗ Ur(V 0) ≥ TU(V ), ∀V.
I now prove (i). Let V ∈ [v(0) − φ(0) + β∆V∗,Vmax). Since V∗ ∈ Φ, I can set
Vi = V∗ for all i. I then set a = 0, and set ci = c for all i, where c ≥ 0 is chosen to
satisfy the promise-keeping constraint (9). Such chosen {a,ci,Vi} satisﬁes constraints
(6)-(9). This proves (i).
I now prove (ii). Notice ﬁrst that V ≥ V∗. Since Ur(·) is concave, (V ,Ur(V )) >p
(V,Ur(V )) for all V ∈ [v(0) − φ(0) + β∆V∗,V ). Next, by Lemma 3 and equation
(15), I have (V ,Ur(V )) >p (V,Uf(V )) for all V ∈ (V∗,V ). I therefore have: if V ∈
[v(0) − φ(0) + β∆V∗,V ) but 6= V∗, then V 6∈ Φ. To prove the lemma then, it is
suﬃcient to show that V ∈ Φ if V ∈ [V ,Vmax). In turn, I need only show that Uf(·)
26is decreasing over the interval [V ,Vmax). This holds according to equations (18) and
(19) which will be derived independently of this lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7.
(i) Suppose V < V and V ∈ Φr. Then U(V ) = Ur(V ) < Ur(V ) = U(V ), implying
that the value function U is not RP, a contradiction.
(ii) Use equations (10)-(11) and the fact that C(g) ≥ 0 for all g ∈ G to obtain
Uf(V∗) = Ur(V ). So the utility pair (V∗,Uf(V∗)) is not Pareto dominated, and so
V∗ ∈ Φr
S
Φf. Since V∗ < V , by (i) it holds that V∗ 6∈ Φr; and hence it must hold
that V∗ ∈ Φf.
Next, let V ∈ (V∗,V ) and suppose V ∈ Φf. Then it must hold that C(g(V )) > 0
for otherwise C(g(V )) = 0 and hence V = V∗. A contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Let V denote a voluntarily terminated worker’s expected utility. That the worker
was voluntarily terminated implies Uf(V ) = Ur(V ) − C[g(V )] > Ur(V ), or Ur(V ) >
Ur(V ) + C[g(V )]. That is, the ﬁrm is strictly better oﬀ hiring an involuntarily un-
employed worker, who is available given π < 1, than hiring a voluntarily terminated
worker and taking his g(V ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10.
Suppose π < 1. Then to show V > V∗ is to show
V >
πV + (1 − π)[v(0) − φ(0)]
1 − (1 − π)β∆
,
or
V > [v(0) − φ(0)]/(1 − β∆) ≡ V0.
To show V > V0, I take two steps.
Step 1. I show V ≥ V0. In fact, V0 is the minimum expected utility that can be
attained by a feasible and incentive compatible contract. This is because, for any
compensation scheme that the contract speciﬁes, since compensation must be non-
negative, the worker can always guarantee for himself expected utility V0 by exerting
zero eﬀorts in all periods.
Step 2. I show V > V0 by showing that V0 is not a RP expected utility, and
therefore V , being a RP expected utility, must be strictly greater than V0.
There is a unique feasible and incentive compatible contract that delivers V0 to the
worker. To show this, notice ﬁrst that if a feasible and incentive compatible contract
delivers expected utility V0 to the worker, then it must hold that ct = 0 for all t. For
otherwise the worker can always choose the action proﬁle {at = 0, ∀t} to do strictly
better than V0. Next, given ct = 0 for all t, clearly the only action proﬁle that is
incentive compatible is at = 0 for all t, and it then follows that Vt = V0 for all t ≥ 1.
So if V0 is RP, then all newly employed workers will stay at V = V0, and the
equilibrium is degenerate. Q.E.D.
27Proof of Lemma 12.
Suppose U is RP. Let (V,Z) ∈ G(U) be such that (V,Z) 6∈ Graph(U) and (V,Z)
is not Pareto dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U). I take the following nine steps
to construct a contradiction.
1. Because U is RP, I have
Graph(U) = Graph(PTU) ⊆ Graph(TU).
2. I show that it is without loss of generality to assume (V,Z) ∈ Graph(TU) ⊆
G(U).
To show this, let ˆ Z = max{Z : (V,Z) ∈ G(U)}. Then (V, ˆ Z) ∈ Graph(TU),
(V, ˆ Z) 6∈ Graph(U) and (V, ˆ Z) is not Pareto dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U).
(V, ˆ Z) ∈ Graph(TU) because if (V, ˆ Z) ∈ Graph(U), then (V,Z) is not Pareto domi-
nated by (V, ˆ Z) ∈ Graph(U), a contradiction. And, because (V, ˆ Z) Pareto dominates
(V,Z) and the latter is not Pareto dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U), (V, ˆ Z) is
not Pareto dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U).
3. Because (V,Z) 6∈ Graph(PTU) = Graph(U), (V,Z) must be dominated
by some (˜ V , ˜ Z) ∈ Graph(TU). But since (V,Z) is not Pareto dominated by any
(V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U), it must be that (˜ V , ˜ Z) ∈ Graph(TU) − Graph(U) 6= ∅.
4. Let
V
∗ ≡ sup{˜ V : (˜ V , ˜ Z) ∈ Graph(TU) − Graph(U), (˜ V , ˜ Z) >p (V,Z)}.
5. I show that V ∗ is an element in [V∗,Vmax), the domain of the function TU.
By the deﬁnition of V ∗, there is a sequence {Vn,Zn} ⊆ Graph(TU) such that
(Vn,Zn) >p (V,Z), ∀n
and
Vn → V
∗, as n → ∞.
Since Vn ∈ [V∗,Vmax) (the domain of TU) for all n, clearly V ∗ ≥ V∗. Therefore I
need only show that V ∗ < Vmax. Suppose V ∗ = Vmax. Then limn→∞ Zn = −∞, and
hence (Vn,Zn) >p (V,Z) must not hold for n large enough.




and it follows that (V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(TU). So either (V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(TU) −
Graph(U) or (V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(U). The contradiction is derived by showing in the
following that neither (V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(TU)−Graph(U) nor (V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(U).
7. Notice that (V ∗,Z∗) ≥p (V,Z). (That is, V ∗ ≥ V , Z∗ ≥ Z.) This holds
because for each n, Vn ≥ V , Zn > Z, and so V ∗ ≥ V and Z∗ ≥ Z.









28That is, (V ∗,Z∗) is not dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U).
Second, notice that there does not exist any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(TU) − Graph(U)
such that (V 0,Z0) >p (V ∗,Z∗). Suppose otherwise. Then because (V ∗,Z∗) ≥p (V,Z),
I have (V 0,Z0) >p (V,Z). Now by the deﬁnition of V ∗, it holds that V 0 ≤ V ∗. But






This is a contradiction to (V 0,Z0) >p (V ∗,Z∗).
I therefore have that (V ∗,Z∗) is not dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(TU).
This in turn implies that (V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(PTU) = Graph(U), a contradiction to
(V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(TU) − Graph(U).
9. Finally, I show (V ∗,Z∗) 6∈ Graph(U). Suppose otherwise. Then (V,Z) is
Pareto dominated by (V ∗,Z∗) ∈ Graph(U). Again a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 13.
Part (i). I show that the optimal contract has ΩI(V ) 6= ∅. Suppose Ω(V ) = ∅.
Let σ = {g(V ),V ∈ Φf; (a(V ),ci(V ),Vi(V )),V ∈ Φr} denote the optimal contract.
Let U : Φr
S
Φf → R be the value function that the optimal contract supports.
In the following, I derive a contradiction by constructing an expected utility pair
(ˆ V , ˆ Z) such that (ˆ V , ˆ Z) ∈ G(U) but (ˆ V , ˆ Z) 6∈ Graph(U) and (ˆ V , ˆ Z) is not Pareto
dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U), and hence, by Lemma 12, U is not renegation-
proof.
I ﬁrst show that the optimal contract has c2(V ) > 0. Suppose not, that is, suppose
c2(V ) = 0. Then increase c2(V ) by δc2 > 0 and reduce V2(V ) by δV2 > 0 such that
v(c2(V ) + δc2) + β∆[V2(V ) − δV2] = v(c2(V )) + β∆V2(V )
or
δV2 = [v(δc2) − v(0)]/β∆.
For δc2 suﬃciently small, the contract remains feasible and incentive compatible, and
satisﬁes the constraint of promise-keeping. But this deviation will cause the ﬁrm’s

















I now show that for δc2 small enough, the value of the above expression is positive.
Since limδc2→0
v(δc2)−v(0)
δc2 = v0(0) = ∞, I need only show U0(V2(V ) 6= 0. Suppose
29V2(V ) ∈ Φf. Then this clearly holds. Suppose V2(V ) ∈ Φr. Then U0(V2(V ) 6= 0 holds
because of the following: (a) The function Ur(·) is concave, (b) its unique maximum
value is attained at V , and (c) V2(V ) > V . To see (c), use the assumption a(V ) = aH.
With two output levels, incentive compatibility in state V requires




which in turn implies V2(V ) > V1(V ). But V1(V ) ≥ V by Proposition 7, since
ΩI(V ) = ∅ and hence V1(V ) ∈ Φr. So (c) holds, and so I have derived a contradiction
to the assumption that the contract σ is optimal, and so it must hold that c2(V ) > 0.
Now with c2(V ) > 0, let
ˆ c1 = c1(V ), ˆ c2 = c2(V ) − , ˆ V1 = V∗, ˆ V2 = V2(V ),
where  is chosen to be positive but suﬃciently small so that ˆ c2 ≥ 0 and the following
holds:
h




v(ˆ c1) + β∆ˆ V1
i
≥ [v(c2(V )) + β∆V2(V )] − [v(c1(V )) + β∆V1(V )] (32)
The condition above ensures that {ˆ a,(ˆ ci, ˆ Vi)} satisﬁes the incentive constraint. Here
the ﬁrst inequality follows the construction of ˆ ci and ˆ Vi, the second inequality follows
the assumption that a(V ) = aH with the optimal contract. The so constructed
{ˆ a,(ˆ ci, ˆ Vi)} obviously also satisﬁes the feasibility constraint. Next, let
ˆ V = (1 − X2(aH))[v(ˆ c1) + β∆ˆ V1] + X2(aH)[v(ˆ c2) + β∆ˆ V2] − φ(aH). (33)
ˆ Z = (1 − X2(aH))[θ1 − ˆ c1 + β∆U(V∗)]
+ X2(aH)[θ2 − ˆ c2 + β∆U(ˆ V2)] + β(1 − ∆)Ur(V ). (34)
The above construction gives me (ˆ V , ˆ Z) ∈ G(U).
Because  > 0 and ˆ V1 = V∗ < V , I have
ˆ V < V . (35)
Meanwhile, because U(V∗) = U(V ) ≥ U(V1(V )) and ˆ c2 < c2(V ), I have
ˆ Z > U(V ). (36)
Because U(V ) ≥ U(V ) for all V , I therefore have (ˆ V , ˆ Z) 6∈ Graph(U), and that
(ˆ V , ˆ Z) is not Pareto dominated by any (V 0,Z0) ∈ Graph(U). U is not RP according
to Lemma 1. A contradiction.
30Part (ii). I show that the optimal contract has ΩI(V ) 6= {θ2}. Suppose ΩI(V ) =
{θ2}. Then incentive compatibility at V requires
[v(c2(V )) + β∆V∗] − [v(c1(V )) + β∆V1(V )] > 0.
Since θ1 6∈ ΩI(V ), I have V1(V ) ≥ V > V∗ (Propositions 7 and 10), the above equation
then implies c2(V ) > c1(V ) ≥ 0.
Consider a deviation from the optimal contract that sets
ˆ c1(V ) = c1(V ), ˆ c2(V ) = c2(V ) − , ˆ V1(V ) = V1(V ), ˆ V2(V ) = V ,
where  is positive but suﬃciently small so that c2(V ) > 0. So under this deviation, in
the utility state V and output state θ2, the worker is retained, instead of terminated;
in the meantime, the worker’s compensation is cut.
The above constructed deviation generates the following expected utilities for the
worker and the ﬁrm:
ˆ V = X1(aH)[v(c1(V )) + β∆V1(V )] + X2(aH)[v(c2(V ) − ) + β∆V ],
ˆ Z = X1(aH)[θ1 − c1(V ) + β∆U(V1(V ))] + X2(aH)[θ2 − (c2(V ) − ) + β∆U(V )].
with
(ˆ V , ˆ Z) >p (V ,U(V )), (37)
and hence (ˆ V , ˆ Z) is not Pareto dominated by any utility pairs in Graph(U). By
Lemma 12, U is not RP. A contradiction.
Part (iii). I show that the optimal contract has ΩI(V ) 6= Θ. Suppose otherwise.
Then set V1(V = V2(V ) = V and reduce c2(V ) by a positive small amount to generate
a pair of utilities that Pareto dominates (V ,U(V ), and is not dominated by any
element in Graph(U). A contradiction to U being RP, by Lemma 5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 14.
To prove the proposition, I need only construct a function Ufb
r : (V ,Vmax) → R
such that for some V ∈ (V ,Vmax),
Ur(V ) ≤ Ufb(V ) < Uf(V ), ∀V ≥ V . (38)
Fix V . Imagine the following scenario. Starting from the current period, the
current worker’s eﬀort becomes observable to the ﬁrm until the termination or death
of the current worker; moral hazard resumes when a new worker is employed. Let the
value of the ﬁrm in this scenario be denote Ufb(V ). Clearly,
Ur(V ) ≤ Ufb(V ), ∀V.
31Consider Ufb(V ). The ﬁrm can choose to retain the worker until he dies, or it can
choose to terminate the worker after a ﬁnite number of periods. Let U1
fb(V ) denote
the value of the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst case, U2
fb(V ) the value of the ﬁrm in the second case.
Then









fb(V ) = θ(a
∗(V )) − c
∗(V ) + β∆U
1
fb(V ) + β(1 − ∆)U(V ),
where a∗(V ) denotes the ﬁrst-best level of eﬀort conditional V being the worker’s
expected utility, θ(a∗(V )) denotes the period expected output conditional on a∗(V ),
and c∗(V ) denotes the constant optimal compensation to the worker. Promise-keeping
requires
c
∗(V ) = v






θ(a∗(V )) − v−1[(1 − β∆)V + φ(a∗(V ))]
1 − β∆
+
β(1 − ∆)U(V )
1 − β∆
≤
θn − v−1[(1 − β∆)V + φ(a)]
1 − β∆
+





Consider next the case where the ﬁrm terminates the worker after a ﬁnite number
of periods. Obviously, if it is optimal to terminate the worker after any periods, then
it is optimal to terminate the worker after just one period. Consider therefore the
case where the worker is terminated after one period. Instead of obtaining a precise
calculation for U2
fb, I now compute an upper bound of it. For that purpose, consider
the best possible scenario for the ﬁrm where, after termination, the worker is employed
every period by some other ﬁrm which gives the worker all the surplus of the match
so the worker’s current employer can incur the least possible cost of termination.
Suppose this translates into a constant compensation of c with a constant level of
eﬀort a∗ ≥ a > 0 for the worker after termination. Now let a1 denote optimal eﬀort
in the ﬁrst period. Let c1 denote the optimal compensation for the worker in the
ﬁrst period, and c2 the optimal compensation in each period after the termination.
Promise-keeping requires
V = u(c1) − φ(a1) +
β∆
1 − β∆
[v(c2 + c) − φ(a∗)].
To minimize cost, the ﬁrm must set c1 = c2 + c, and hence









−1[(1 − β∆)(V + φ(a1)) + β∆φ(a∗)] − c.
The value of the ﬁrm in this case is therefore equal to
θ(a1) − (c2 + c) −
β∆
1 − β∆
c2 + βU(V )
= θ(a1) − c −














Uf(V ) ≥ −g(V ) + U(V ) =




Uf(V ) − Ufb(V ) ≥ Uf(V ) − max{ˆ U
1






where C is constant in V and
K(V ) ≡ v
−1[(1 − β∆)V + φ(a)] − v
−1[(1 − β∆)V ]
= φ(a)(v
−1)
0[(1 − β∆)V + ξ]
where ξ ∈ [0,φ(a)]. I can now conclude this proof by noticing that for V suﬃciently
large, K(V ) is suﬃciently large to make
K(V )
1−β∆ + C positive and hence (38) hold for
some suﬃciently large V . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 17.
Since V (Vmin) > Vmin,
f(Vmin) = π(Vmin)V (Vmin) + (1 − π(Vmin))[v(0) − φ(0) + β∆Vmin]
> π(Vmin)Vmin + (1 − π(Vmin))[v(0) − φ(0) + β∆Vmin]
= Vmin.
This proves the lemma. Q.E.D.





33To prove the lemma is to show that the constraint V ≥ V∗ must hold as an equality
for V∗ suﬃciently large. Suppose otherwise. That is, suppose V (V∗) > V∗. I derive
a contradiction by showing in the following that V (V∗) is not optimal. Observe ﬁrst
that for V∗ suﬃciently close to Vmax, the constraint V ≥ V∗ and the promise-keeping
constraint V =
P
i Xi(a)[v(ci) − φ(a) + β∆Vi] together imply that ci > 0 for all i
with the optimal contract. Consider now a deviation from the supposedly optimal
contract. This deviation reduces the worker’s consumption ci by dci, i = 1,...,N,
where {dci} is chosen to satisfy v0(ci)dci = ∆ > 0, ∀i. The resulting new contract is
feasible and incentive compatible, with which the worker’s expected utility is reduced
by ∆ but the ﬁrm’s value is strictly increased. A contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 19.
Observe that
f(x) − x = π(x)[V (x) − x] + (1 − π(x))[v(0) − φ(0) − (1 − β∆)x]
By Lemma 12, V (x) − x = 0 for x suﬃciently large. Since x ≥ Vmin = [v(0) −
φ(0)]/(1 − β∆), the lemma is proved. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: The value functions










Figure 2: The law of motion for the worker’s expected utility









Figure 3: The worker’s compensation









Figure 4: The optimal eﬀort








Figure 5: The stationary distribution of worker expected utility
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